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SOVEREIGNTY THIS CENTURY - 
MAORI AND THE COMMON LAW 
CONSTITUTION 
Paul McHugh* 
This paper is an attempt to give a panorama of constitutional life in New Zealand this century 
as viewed through a particularly important window, the status of the aboriginal Maori people of 
these islands. Questions of Maori rights and their position in the constitutional order have become 
burning issues in this final quarter century and represent an immense challenge for the next. This 
exploration is particularly appropriate as we celebrate a century of law teaching in this capital city 
at a University which has produced many if not most of this country's distinguished and influential 
public lawyers. In many respects, the history we are about to review is also a history of common law 
constitutionalism in this country as well to a lesser extent as similar Anglophonic jurisdictions. We 
are looking not just at how that part of the common law we call "public law" has dealt with a 
particular ethnic group. Through this aboriginal window we are looking at the changing logic and 
reach of public law through the past century and at the nature and character of the common law 
itself. 
I INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between the Crown, as holding and embodying the power of the state, 
and its subjects has been the enduring preoccupation of common law constitutionalism. 
This fixation has been embodied in that single, highly problematic word "sovereignty". For 
common lawyers, sovereignty has been a powerful organising concept which has 
dominated the way in which they think about public power and the nature of authority. 
The century of relations between Crown and Maori has been conducted in the shadow of 
that concept and the accompanying preoccupation with the "who" question, that is, the 
location of ultimate political authority. So a major theme in this paper will be sovereignty 
as the axis of constitutional thought and practice in the common law. 
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There are two closely linked processes going on as we common lawyers think and act 
upon our idea of the constitution. First, we are acting upon some sense of the constitution 
as a living body of doctrine and rules authorising certain conduct within the public sphere 
- the constitution as a set of available possibilities. But there is a second dimension to our 
common law method, one accentuated by the lack of an authoritative single constitutional 
instrument. This is the sense of the historic authorisation of the constitution. Common 
lawyers routinely and instinctively use the past to authorise the present. This trait is 
fundamental to common law method and supplies a vital element of common law 
constitutionalism, namely the sense of our constitution as an historically validated 
arrangement. Those two themes - of constitutional practice and historical authorisation of 
that practice - like that of sovereignty also have their own history. There is a history of 
constitutional practice and another history, an intellectual one, of the ways we have given 
that constitution historical validation (a history as it were of constitutional historiography). 
We will be dealing not just with themes - of sovereignty, constitutional practice and 
historiography - but with the history of those themes.  
Societies exist in time and place and have their own depictions and memories of 
themselves as so existing.1 A constitution is, at least in western societies, a major 
expression of that activity - a fundamental means by which a society locates and authorises 
its organisation and presence in time and place. A constitution authorises and regulates 
political behaviour and where the polity lacks a single paramount and foundational 
document, then the sense of historical continuity will be a crucial source of constitutional 
authority. In today's world, a constitution authorises the power of the state, and part of 
that authorisation will involve invocation of the constitution's past as a means of 
legitimating or otherwise explaining its present arrangement. As well as carrying its own 
present and immediate authority, a constitution, especially an unwritten one, rests upon a 
shared sense of historical validation. Through that a polity is able to see itself as a 
continuous structure in time and place. As our constitutional arrangements spring from 
the common law, the concern here will be with the language of the common law both as a 
system of possibilities and as a way of remembering the past. It is those themes which I 
will discuss here - the constitution as a living and immediate thing as well as an historical 
artefact. 
Let me start with an example. 
  
1 J G A Pocock "Languages and their Implications: the Transformation of the Study of Political 
Thought" in J G A Pocock Politics, Language and Time Essays on Political Thought and History 
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1971) 3. 
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In the early seventeenth century when Englishmen described their relationship with an 
excessive Stuart monarch they used the common law.2 This common law was more than a 
body of rules describing their rights and liberties - it was a whole dominant way of 
thinking about political relationships in early Stuart England and was then the dominant 
(secular) language of political discourse. This language was not restricted in usage to a 
specialist clerisy centred around the Inns of Court and Westminster Hall, but was more 
widespread in its availability and practice. All educated Englishmen were versed in the 
language of the common law. This seventeenth century common law spoke of the ancient 
constitution of Englishmen, a constitution handed down from their ancient Gothic 
ancestors. These ancestors were conceived as living in a state of perfect, uncorrupted 
liberty in their forests and glens and it was this idealised state which Englishmen wished 
to have restored to them in seventeenth century England. At this time, Englishmen 
conceived of a constitutional order which was ancient, unwritten, enduring and 
historically undifferentiating, that is the rights this ancient constitution gave to their 
ancestors were identical to those demanded in the England of the early seventeenth 
century. Yet though that common law thinking refused to differentiate the ancient 
situation of Englishmen from their present (except in the present being one of deprivation), 
the rights they demanded were undoubtedly modern in character - jury trial and taxation 
only through Parliament, for example. 
Ancient constitutionalism displayed two closely related features of common law 
method which have endured through several centuries.3 First, it demonstrated the 
constitution as having its own contemporaneity; that is to say, the constitution as a 
dynamic system living in and responding to its own turbulent and contingent present. The 
example I have given also reveals how at that time common lawyers had an historical 
memory of the constitution and recourse to this memory was itself an important part of the 
politics of the constitution. As ancient constitutionalism showed, this historical memory 
was very much apt to be affected by the requirements of the present. Common lawyers 
have always had a present- 
 
  
2 The classic text is JGA Pocock The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law: A Study in English 
Historical Thought in the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1957). 
Also Glenn Burgess The Politics of the Ancient Constitution: An Introduction to English Political 
Thought, 1603-42 (Macmillan Press, London, 1992). 
3 For instance the essays in E Sandoz (ed) The Roots of Liberty: Magna Carta, Ancient Constitution 
and the Anglo-American Tradition of Rule of Law (University of Missouri Press, Columbia, 1993). 
In the context of Treaty claims in New Zealand, see R Boast "Lawyers, Historians, Ethics and 
the Judicial Process" (1998) 28 VUWLR 87. 
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minded conception of the past,4 for that is central to their method. We do not study the 
past for its own sake but to establish authority within our own present. We imbue legal 
principle with a timelessness which allows us, if our own internal logic requires, to give a 
case from, say, 1794 as much imperative as one from 1994. Thus, when the New Zealand 
Court of Appeal speaks of "Treaty principles" and uses concepts like partnership, 
fiduciary-like duties and obligations of good faith it is not reading the Treaty of Waitangi 
as an historical document. Rather it is engaged in a public and somewhat controversial 
though utterly typical form of common law reasoning which is using the past to resolve 
contemporary problems.5  
In the past 20 years, claims by aboriginal peoples in the courts and broader canvas of 
political life have made us as common lawyers more aware of its method as well as its 
doctrine. In the context of aboriginal peoples we realise that common law method and 
doctrine has been applied to a community outside its history and cultural thrall. This 
application to aboriginal peoples is as much as anything else the realpolitik of their 
colonised condition. But as common lawyers we can be self-aware within that situation, 
acknowledging the weaknesses as well as strengths of what is a robust vibrant human 
tradition. The greatest achievement of Anglophonic political culture, Sir Matthew Hale's 
seventeenth century metaphor is appropriately applied to us as tangata waka6, for we are 
all people of the canoes. The common law has been like the Argonaut's ship, which has 
  
4 See for example F W Maitland "Why the History of English Law is not Written" (1888) in The 
Collected Papers of Frederic William Maitland (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1911) 
Vol I, 491: "Thus we are tempted to mix up two different logics: the logic of authority, and the 
logic of evidence ... What the lawyers want is authority; ... what the historian wants is evidence 
... This when stated is obvious; but we often conceal it from ourselves under some phrase 
about the common law." Also W Murphy "The Oldest Social Science? The Epistemic Properties 
of the Common Law Tradition" (1991) 54 MLR 182, 200; M Oakeshott "The Activity of Being an 
Historian" in M Oakeshott Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (Pluto Press, London, 1962) 
137; P Goodrich and Y Hachamovitch "Time out of Mind: An Introduction to the Semiotics of 
Common Law" in P Fitzpatrick (ed) Dangerous Supplements: Resistance and Renewal in 
Jurisprudence (Pluto Press, London, 1991) 159. 
5  See also R Boast's excellent article "Lawyers, Historians, Ethics and the Judicial Process" (1998) 
28 VUWLR 87. 
6 This phrase has been used by Professor JGA Pocock to suggest an historiography of co-
existence between Maori and Pakeha: "peoples of the ship, who have ocean voyages and the 
discovery of islands in their memory, their language and their history" in Professor J G A 
Pocock "Law, Sovereignty and History in a Divided Culture: The Case of New Zealand and 
the Treaty of Waitangi" (1998) 43 McGill Law J 481, 501 ["Law, Sovereignty and History"]. 
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journeyed around the world carrying its scars and patches, its makeshift planks, hull and 
mast,  not each the same that set out yet demonstrably still the same vessel.7  
The intention here is to review a century of constitutional thought and practice in New 
Zealand through these two closely related themes of a constitution which is both set in a 
politicised present and which is also put into a past politicised by the present. Specifically, 
I will use the position of the aboriginal Maori people of New Zealand as a window to the 
experience of common law constitutional life on these islands. I hope that it will become 
plain that the themes I will touch upon apply more broadly to other contexts of New 
Zealand public life this century. The changing conceptions of judicial review are an 
example. Also, since we are dealing with the common law tradition I will make some 
observations about other Anglophonic common law jurisdictions. I am about to talk of 
three phases in the legal and constitutional position of Maori through the past century. 
These phases are also observable in North America and, to a fainter extent, Australia.8 
The three phases which I am about to identify are not to be thought of as self-contained 
and rigidly separate. Rather they are three moods or climates - a kind of collective (sub-) 
consciousness which sustained enough in practice and thought and became in their time 
the predominant outlook. These are not water-tight periods so much as prevailing moods 
and positions, a "tradition" of that time. 
Specifically, the constitutional phases through which relations with Maori have passed 
this century are these: 
First, the longest phase with which this century began and which continued for nearly 
70 years. This period may be called the Age of Leviathan, a reference to Thomas Hobbes' 
conception of an absolute sovereign with limitless and indivisible authority. In this period 
the New Zealand constitution took a sovereign-centred view of itself and its own history. 
It was, to use another person's phrase, the high period of the "Empire of Uniformity".9  
The second phase may be described as "claims-time" - the period during the late 1970s 
and through the 1980s when Maori claims were heard and mechanisms set in place to 
address them. This phase coincided with a period in which the general principles of public 
  
7 Sir Matthew Hale The History of the Common Law of England (published posthumously, 
reprinted 1713, 1716 and 1739); CM Gray (ed) The History of the Common Law of England by Sir 
Matthew Hale (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1971) 40. 
8 Other writers have attempted to identify phases in Crown-aboriginal relations often in a 
comparative context. See Paul Havemann, editorial introduction, Indigenous Peoples' Rights in 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1999) 22-23. 
9 James Tully Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1995) 83. 
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law concerning the justiciability of the exercise of power by state officials were broadening. 
Aboriginal claims - and the extension and incipient sophistication of judge-made doctrine 
during this period - should be seen in the context of these other developments in the 
public sphere of the common law; a particular manifestation of the common law's growing 
concern about the reach of the state and the position of the individual. 
The third phase, where somewhat bumpily and unsettledly we are today, might be 
called "settlement-time". In New Zealand today the Crown is negotiating and concluding 
large settlements with Maori and this has produced a raft of constitutional and legal issues 
quite distinct to those which arose in claims-time. A similar jurisprudence of settlement is 
also emerging in Canada. It will be suggested that some of the legal and constitutional 
issues which this new political environment has generated are part of wider questions 
about the new role and ambit of public law in a context of dispersing (which is to say, less 
centralised) state power. 
In each of those three phases one can discern distinct conceptions about the range of 
constitutional possibilities relating to Maori - what could be done in that particular legal 
present. There were also distinct ways of conceiving the constitutional past - how that 
particular present was then using its past.  
II THE AGE OF LEVIATHAN 
The late nineteenth and much of the present century has been the great age of state 
nationalism, of the western conception of states as absolute sovereign beings. In this 
international setting, Britain and the Anglophonic states sharing the common law orbit 
(most as satellites of Westminster) moved, during the nineteenth century, towards a view 
of state sovereignty which might be described as Hobbesian. This adjective has been taken 
from Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan, a famous seventeenth century tract which became 
influential with the nineteenth century legal positivists10 and wherein the power of the 
sovereign Leviathan is described as absolute in being indivisible, unaccountable and 
unlimitable. It is this Hobbesian depiction which has gripped New Zealand's 
constitutional imagination for most of this century, as indeed most Anglophonic common 
law jurisdictions. 
By the early nineteenth century the basic principle of the supremacy of the Crown in 
Parliament had long been established - that, after all, was what the Glorious and French 
Revolutions had been all about. However, during this period the English began to take a 
more conscious (and at times precious) attitude towards sovereignty as the central element 
of constitutional thought. Since at least the early seventeenth century, English political 
  
10 M Francis "The Nineteenth Century Theory of Sovereignty and the Influence of Thomas 
Hobbes" [1980] History of Political Thought 517. 
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history had been a tussle over the location of the sovereign (that is, paramount political) 
power. Even after that was settled finally in 1745, there remained another century and a 
half of momentum in the issue: not until the end of the nineteenth century do we find the 
result of 1745 inscribed monumentally into the public sphere. 
Before attempting a general explanation of that result, we can see the growing concern 
during the early nineteenth century with sovereignty as a doctrine by looking, for 
example, at imperial practice. The Six Nations of the Great Lakes region were the "allies" of 
the Crown after the Treaty of Paris 1763, but by the early 1830s they had mysteriously 
transformed into subjects of the Crown,11 at what moment or by what means no one has 
ever been able to explain. So too the inhabitants of the Mofussil, the Mughal provinces of 
Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, over which the East India Company obtained in 1765 a grant of 
diwani12 (certain jurisdictional capacities derived from the Mughal).13 By the 1820s these 
inhabitants were also the subjects of the Crown,14 the transformation in their relationship 
with the Crown again a matter of mystery. By the 1820s, imperial and colonial officials and 
judges15 were showing a much keener awareness of the nature of their sovereign rights 
over territory. The Treaty of Waitangi and similar treaties of cession in West Africa during 
the mid-nineteenth century16 are symptomatic of this sharper awareness of the nature of 
sovereignty and the growing insistence upon precision in the acquisition.17 
This sharpening perception during the early nineteenth century of "sovereignty" was 
exposing the Hobbesian doctrine long implicit in British constitutionalism, although not 
packaged into a doctrinal bundle, and which, by the 1850s was set into imperial practice: 
  
11 This was the position taken most notably by John Beverly Robinson, Attorney-General and 
later Chief Justice of Upper Canada: Robinson A-G to Boulton S-G, 31 October 1829, NA RG 
10, Vol 5: fol 2290-91; Sheldon v Ramsay (1852) 9 UCQB 105, 134 per Robinson CJ. 
12 Text in 43 Consolidated Treaty Series 217. 
13 MP Jain Outlines of Indian Legal History (2 ed, NM Tripathi, Bombay, 1966) 82-84. 
14 The Charter Act 1813, 53 Geo III, c 155 declared for the first time the undoubted sovereignty of 
the Crown. The Act was taken as declaratory: Mayor of the City of Lyons v East India Co (1836) 1 
Moo PC 175, 18 ER 66. 
15 For example Freeman v Fairlie (1828) 1 Moo Ind App 305; 18 ER 117 (Ch). 
16 For instance the Ceded Mile Treaty with King Burungai Sonko of Barra (1826) (text in 78 
Consolidated Treaty Series 281) and see the account in JM Gray A History of the Gambia 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1940) 341. The tempo of British treaty-making in 
West Africa increased dramatically from the mid-1820s: see E Hertslet The Map of Africa by 
Treaty (2 ed, London, 1896). 
17 Also E Hertslet "Memorandum on Formalities Necessary for Effective Annexation" 18 October 
1884 in FO84/1813:246-65; WE Hall A Treatise on the Foreign Powers and Jurisdiction of the British 
Crown (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1894). 
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sovereignty as absolute, territorial, indivisible and unlimitable.18 At the same time in the 
1830s and across the Atlantic, the American Supreme Court, in a series of cases usually 
associated with Chief Justice John Marshall, considered the status of the independent 
Indian tribes. The tribes were recognised by the federal common law as "domestic 
dependent nations" retaining a residual sovereignty with an inherent right to self-
government.19 Marshall's doctrine of tribal sovereignty was based upon the wider 
constitutional predicates the Americans had recently vindicated with blood and which his 
court was then articulating. This was an American vision of sovereignty as divided, 
confederative, popular and accountable; in a word justiciable. This was a form of 
constitutionalism which the British were unable to take.20 Britain in the early to mid 
nineteenth century was not wholly impervious to American constitutional practice for 
eventually it incorporated federalism into its imperial practice. But when it came in the 
1850s and 1860s (in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa), that federalism 
was not conceived in the American style but in the pragmatism which is the hallmark of 
British constitutional practice.21 Marshall may have applied what was essentially, though 
not explicitly, a quasi-federative model to the Indian tribes, but that was one which was 
never even remotely a conceptual possibility for the tribes under British sovereignty. 
Locked in their view of unitary sovereignty, British officials regarded James Busby's 
Confederation of United Tribes 183522 as a convenient way of dealing with the northern 
tribes en masse - as a potentially useful and pragmatic, albeit compromised, device23 - but, 
  
18 See Henry Maine Ancient Law (Dent, London, 1861) 84, who termed it a postulate lying "at the 
threshold of the International Code, and it is also one which could not possibly have been 
subscribed to during the first centuries of modern European history". 
19 Cherokee Nation v State of Georgia (1831) 5 Peters 1; Worcester v State of Georgia (1832) 6 Peters 
515; Mitchel v United States (1835) 9 Peters 711. 
20 On its ham-stringing effect on imperial practice see W Ross Johnston Sovereignty and Protection: 
A Study of British Jurisdictional Imperialism in the Late Nineteenth Century (Duke University Press, 
Durham (NC), 1973). 
21 K Kendle Federal Britain A History (Routledge, London, 1997) 18-57. 
22 "Declaration of Independence", signed by thirty five chiefs who "in the opinion of the 
Reverend W Williams" formed "a fair representation of the population of the Country" from 
North Cape to the River Thames" (28 October 1835) despatch and enclosure in Busby to 
Colonial Secretary (NSW) in CO 209/2: 95. (Copy received in Colonial Office 4 June 1836). 
23 The Declaration contained an article against the Hokianga liquor laws passed by Busby's rival, 
the "Additional British Resident", James McDonnell, and that was regarded as a flaw: Bourke 
to Glenelg, 10 March 1836, CO 209/2:10. Busby protested that the Hokianga law could not 
have any effect as the Confederacy did not exist at the time of its purported enactment: Busby 
to Colonial Secretary (NSW), 16 March 1836 in CO 209/2: 210; Glenelg to Bourke, 26 August 
1836 in CO 209/2: 20-21. 
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unlike their officious Resident, they saw no constitutional possibilities or consequences in 
it. It was an indifference which had also marked British relations with the Six Nations 
Confederacy in the years after the Treaty of Paris 1763: Confederations of tribes were 
convenient conglomerations but were not endowed with any overarching, unified 
sovereignty. 
The British inability at this time to conceive of sovereignty as limited, divided and 
confederative had less to do with imperial practice - although that had something to do 
with it - than the state of political conditions and thought within Britain itself. Here one 
must understand the importance of the representative principle in nineteenth century 
British political practice and thought. The mid-nineteenth century was the age of 
Parliamentary reform when the representative principle dominated Englishmen's 
conception of the constitution and proved itself elastic enough to achieve lasting reform. 
At this time the great Whig histories of Britain were being published, transmitting more 
than merely an account of British history.24 These were epic tales about the British 
constitution and the vindication and celebration of the representative principle. Parliament 
was thus cast as the triumphalist hero, the very foundation of this epic narrative and the 
answer to the "who" (held sovereignty) question, which for so long had obsessed British 
political history. Maine's (pre-)historism25 and Herbert Spencer's social Darwinism came 
to lubricate this tale,26 which saw the British Constitution, with Parliament ascendant, as 
the historically destined endpoint of centuries of constitutional life. The attachment to the 
representative principle runs arterially as the organising narrative theme of the influential 
Whig histories of the mid-nineteenth century. It was not merely influenced by, but was a 
direct outcome of the common law tradition and centuries of political experience. And we 
see recurring the two enduring features of common law method which we have already 
observed in ancient constitutionalism, namely the belief in the immortal continuity of the 
constitution and the present-minded use of the past by which the whole narrative 
momentum was determined by the eventual outcome: the triumph of Parliament and the 
representative principle. 
  
24 JW Burrow A Liberal Descent: Victorian Historians and the English Past (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1981). See also J Vernon "Narrating the Constitution: the Discourse of 'the 
Real' and the Fantasies of Nineteenth Century Constitutional History" in J Vernon Re-reading 
the Constitution: New Narratives in the Political History of England's Long Nineteenth Century 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996) 204, 206 suggesting that the histories of 
Macaulay, Stubbs and, later, Maitland "came to represent the founding texts of not just 
constitutional history, but the English historiographical tradition itself". 
25 Stephen A Siegel "Historism in Late Nineteenth Century Constitutional Thought" [1990] 
Wisconsin Law Review 1431. 
26 M Hawkins Social Darwinism in European and American Thought 1860-1945 (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1997) 67-73. 
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By the mid-nineteenth century, common law method and practice was positivising. 
Influenced by Bentham and, more dramatically, John Austin, a "science of law" was 
emerging and asserting its separateness from history. The common law changed from its 
classical form where it had been both a language of political discourse and way of thinking 
with its own internal logic.27 It was becoming the specialised language of a professional 
clerisy. Demands of external logic also came to be imposed upon the common law - 
requirements of doctrinal coherence, uniformity and predictability. So from the beginning 
of the nineteenth century we see the formal doctrine of precedent emerging (and with it 
the makings of modern  
law reporting28), the law of contract developing quite dramatically29 and, in the academy 
law disengaging from history. Law became viewed as a positive command located in 
statute or case and the task of the lawyer essentially forensic - to retrieve that command. 
This change was, of course, not merely a result of intellectual pressure for greater legal 
coherence. It was also, and more particularly, the juridical response to an industrialising 
and imperial Britain. The positivisation of common law method was a reform performed 
by the common law on itself; part of the implicit trade-off which ensured its domination of 
the ideological apparatus of Victorian Britain and Empire. The nineteenth century histories 
of Great Britain in glorifying the British constitution also glorified the common law itself. 
So successful was that achievement, so thorough and all-encompassing the belief in the 
historical continuity of the British constitution described in the great Whig histories, that 
the notion of sovereignty itself could also positivise: the sovereignty of the Crown-in-
Parliament was put beyond any historical explanation. Detached from its historical 
foundation, for common lawyers the sovereignty of the Crown simply was there as though 
eternal.30  
There has been no stronger example of that than the influential work of Albert Venn 
Dicey, the late Victorian jurist introduced to all law students at their first constitutional 
  
27 GJ Postema Bentham and the Common Law Tradition (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986); M Lobban 
The Common Law and English Jurisprudence 1760-1850 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991); D 
Lieberman The Province of Legislation Determined: Legal Theory in Eighteenth Century Britain 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989). 
28 Jim Evans "Change in the Doctrine of Precedent During the Nineteenth Century" in L 
Goldstein (ed) Precedent in Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987) 35-72. 
29 Generally see P Atiyah The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1979) 
and J Gordley The Philosophical Origins of Modern Contract Doctrine (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1991). 
30 A Carty "English Constitutional Law from a Postmodernist Perspective" in P Fitzpatrick (ed) 
Dangerous Supplements: Resistance and Renewal in Jurisprudence (Pluto Press, London, 1991) 182, 
especially 199.  
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law lecture (in my case by Professor Quentin-Baxter). Dicey distinguished legal from 
political sovereignty. Legal sovereignty was vested in the Crown, through its prerogative 
and in Parliament. The rules of legal sovereignty were for him immutable and 
fundamental common law principles. Dicey demonstrated how the historical validation of 
the sovereignty of the Crown-in-Parliament had disengaged from the legal explanation. 
This legal sovereignty was, and remains, the incontrovertible starting point for 
constitutional lawyers. Cast in an eternal present tense, the legal sovereignty of the Crown 
always is, like the common law itself, unscathed and untouchable by time, receding 
infinitely into the past and into the future; a force, no less, of secular redemption.31  
For Dicey the two pillars of the British constitution were, first, the supremacy of the 
Crown-in-Parliament and, second, the rule of law. For him these two were like inseparable 
Siamese twins, each incapable of living without the other, and if one is to talk of Dicey as 
having a conception of sovereignty, it must be in the sense of these two aspects.32 
However, the emphasis which he put upon Parliament's paramount status fitted in more 
obviously to the momentum of British political life which had carried the concern with the 
location of ultimate constitutional authority beyond 1745 and into the great Whig histories. 
Dicey was thus regarded as performing in legal doctrine what the Whig historians had 
accomplished historiographically, the monumentalising of the paramount sovereignty of 
the Crown-in-Parliament. That this subordination of the rule of law to the might of 
Parliament might not be so desirable did not occur to Dicey in 1885 who was a strong 
Whig; scornful of foreign constitutional practice (the French and the American especially), 
and holding a great belief in the institution of Parliament and the common law. Although 
there was no theoretical limit on the sovereign power, he believed there were implicit non-
legal limits. Of those, the most important were constitutional conventions and the fact that 
Members of Parliament were gentlemen and would, in his mind, behave accordingly. 
These, of course, were the days before the party system exerted a stranglehold over 
Parliament. That was an opinion he later came to doubt in the new century as anxiously he 
saw Home Rule and socialism engulfing his beloved constitution.33 However, in Dicey the 
supremacy of Parliament is able to become the foremost rule of constitutional law because 
of the endemic belief in the political principle of representation on which it rested. This 
belief in the ameliorative effect of the representative principle - the "political sovereignty" 
  
31 AV Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (10 ed, Macmillan & Co, 
London, 1962) 12-19. 
32 Dicey, above n 31, 406-414. 
33 John McEldowney "Dicey in Historical Perspective - A Review Essay" in P McAuslan and J 
McEldowney (eds) Law, Legitimacy and the Constitution (Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1985) 39-
61. 
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of the electorate he termed it - enabled him to reconcile the apparent absolutism of our 
constitutional law with the democratic character of its exercise. His views were so 
influential precisely because this devotion to Parliamentary representation expressed a 
widespread belief and because it so perfectly matched political practice and the authorised 
versions of English political history. 
I have given this very general description of British constitutional thought in the 
nineteenth century as a prelude to discussion of New Zealand. For the tradition of 
constitutional thought which has been dominant in this country through most of this 
century has been a continuation of the British one described by Dicey.34 Generations of 
New Zealand common lawyers have been reared in the Hobbesian tradition in which we 
are taught to view the sovereignty of the Crown as undivided and, the "manner and form" 
debate excepted, unlimitable. The accompanying sense of history which we are given of 
the New Zealand constitution is a more streamlined, condensed and vastly less turbulent 
version of the British one. The "better Britain" tale of our cultural history35 applies as 
strongly to our constitution, although it was a little later in emergence. It is the tale of an 
infant Crown colony moving through a rather pimple-free adolescence with responsible 
government to mature independent statehood with the adoption of the Statute of 
Westminster in 1947 and the final formality, the Constitution Act 1986.36 The development 
of our representative institutions becomes the yardstick of constitutional growth, and we 
are told that that growth, through childhood, teens and adulthood, has been a healthy and 
happy one.37 Nationhood, we are told, has its own unstoppable momentum.38  
If one were to identify a period when this Whig constitutional consciousness took root 
in New Zealand one might associate it with the Liberal Government of 1891-1912. During 
this period a wide range of social legislation was passed. Historians have debated whether 
this was the beginning of the welfare state or not.39 Whatever it was, it certainly was a 
period from when the notion of the centralised unitary state as Leviathan could flourish. 
  
34 See for example the editorial comments in Dicey, above n 31, 86, where New Zealand is 
identified as having "reproduced the purely Dicey doctrine in its entirety." 
35 J Belich Making Peoples: A History of the New Zealanders From Polynesian Settlement to the End of 
the Nineteenth Century (Penguin Press, Auckland, 1996) especially 302. 
36 P Oliver "Cutting the Imperial Link - Canada and New Zealand" in PA Joseph (ed) Essays on 
the Constitution (Brookers, Wellington, 1995) 368-404 ["Essays on the Constitution"]. 
37 More fully P McHugh "The Historiography of New Zealand's Constitutional History" in Essays 
on the Constitution above n 36, 344-367. 
38 PA Joseph "Introduction" to Essays on the Constitution above n 36, 25. 
39 D Hamer The New Zealand Liberals: The Years of Power 1891 - 1912 (Auckland University Press, 
Auckland, 1988); compare WH Oliver "Reeves, Sinclair and the Social Pattern" in P Munz (ed) 
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The splendour of the tradition of constitutional thought which has dominated New 
Zealand common lawyers' conception of their constitution this century lies in its 
invisibility, its sheer humility. It is said, rather disingenuously, we have no "theory" of the 
constitution, yet we are led to believe our perfectly formed, clean-limbed constitution 
occurred osmotically.40 This observation is correct in the sense that our constitutional 
arrangements do not have a deliberative foundation (if we exclude the Treaty of Waitangi 
for a moment). But that is to state the rather obvious. However, for most of the twentieth 
century, constitutionally we have taken the Hobbesian position41 and that, in turn, has 
endorsed a wider political vision of the state as beneficent Leviathan. This absolutism has 
been the constitutional element in the philosophy of the welfare state. The observation that 
there is no theory of our constitution is also incorrect in as much as it might refer to the 
way in which we view the history of our constitutional experience, for here a theory - or 
blue-print or master narrative (whatever you may call it) - has been applied 
retrospectively: we have developed a state-centred (or Whig) history of our constitution 
which has so perfectly matched the drift of twentieth century political life in New Zealand 
as to be indiscernible. The sense of there being no history of our constitution other than 
this normal happy childhood and rather sedate adulthood, this Parliament-centred history, 
has been the historical consciousness of our constitution. We have had a theory as well as 
an historical consciousness of our constitution by the pretence of lacking them.42 
Every week in some provincial or national paper, Pakeha New Zealanders reveal this 
disconnection from any sense of their historical selves. The "letters to the editor" pages are 
often full of Pakeha pillorying the Treaty of Waitangi. They ask why a document over 150 
years old should have any worth today. They say it is better to scrap the Treaty and live in 
the here and now, in the conditions of a modern New Zealand unshackled to a distant, 
irrelevant past. This theme rings chorally through Pakeha vox pop on the Treaty. It is not 
necessarily a means of denying justice to Maori - although in some cases it can be - so 
much as an inability to see the past as haunting the political present. Pakeha politics, like 
                                                                                                                                                                 
The Feel of Truth: Essays in New Zealand and Pacific History (Victoria University of Wellington, 
Wellington, 1969) 175. 
40 PA Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (Law Book Company, Sydney, 
1993) 107-112 ["Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand"]. 
41 For instance GWR Palmer New Zealand's Constitution in Crisis - Reforming our Political System 
(McIndoe, Dunedin, 1992) decrying "the unfortunate influence of Thomas Hobbes" 42-44. 
42  Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand above n 40, 107: "New Zealand's 
progression from Crown colony to independent sovereign state has been regular, continuous 
and uneventful." 
14 (2000) 31 VUWLR 
the common law sovereignty of the Crown, seem to inhabit this eternal present where 
justice is distributive rather than historical.43 
In the end I am making a rather simple point. It is that during the first 70 years of this 
century our sense of constitutional practice and history has matched our broader national 
political experience and vision: to repeat, the state as beneficent Leviathan. One of our 
greatest jurists, Sir John Salmond realised this vital connection between political practice 
and constitutional law (although as a "theoretical" jurist he avoided the historiographical 
element to which I have also been referring). He said: 44 
Constitutional law and practice react upon each other, each striving to assimilate the other to 
itself. The objective facts of state organization tend to mould legal theory into conformity with 
themselves. They seek expression and recognition through legislation, or through the law-
creating functions of the courts. Conversely, the accepted legal theory endeavours to realise 
itself in the facts. 
Salmond took a much less static view than Dicey and his account of constitutional change 
presaged the important changes in public law taken by the common law decades later. He 
did not see the Hobbesian theory of sovereignty as logically pressing nor, inferentially, 
historically inevitable. Although purporting to provide principles of jurisprudence outside 
the common law paradigm, his reasoning showed how he was every inch the common 
lawyer. To him sovereignty was not subordinate to - that is, dominated by the "who" 
question - but encompassed by the rule of law;45 the classical common law position. 
Like most in his time Salmond was also, however, a believer in the power of 
representation. Though he described in principle the incorporation of the sovereign power 
into the rule of law, there is no sign of him having modern notions of the justiciability of 
the Crown's conduct. His approach was one stressing the connection between 
constitutional practice and law and, at this time in national life, that practice and law put 
the Crown's relations with Maori in a special zone of the prerogative. Indeed it was 
Salmond who drafted the Native Land Act 1909 which effectively sealed Maori attempts to 
vindicate  
 
  
43  For a philosophical critique of historical injustice as a basis for reparation see J Waldron 
"Historic Injustice: Its Remembrance and Supercession" in G Oddie and R Perrett (eds) Justice, 
Ethics and New Zealand Society (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1992) 139. 
44  JW Salmond Jurisprudence or The Theory of the Law (Stevens and Haynes, London, 1902) 205. 
45  Salmond, above n 44, Appendix II "The Theory of Sovereignty", 629. 
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their aboriginal property rights in the courts.46 This legislation was passed partly47 to 
clarify conclusively48 the confusion arising from the Privy Council's advice in Nireaha 
Tamaki v Baker49 and Wallis v Solicitor-General.50 A large part of that had been achieved 
through the Land Titles Protection Act 1902,51 but, the 1909 Act finally and authoritatively 
silenced the possibility of Maori asserting aboriginal property rights against the Crown in 
the courts.52 
In 1877, Chief Justice Prendergast had denied the Maori tribes any residual or even 
original sovereign status.53 This supported Crown sovereignty at a time when it was being 
challenged, for in the central North Island at least three tribes remained de facto "domestic 
nations". Prendergast CJ had described the Crown's relations with Maori as arising under 
a peculiar branch of the royal prerogative. This was a view which thirty years later 
Salmond  
 
  
46  Salmond wrote a Memorandum for the Native Land Act 1909 which was published with the 
Act. He comments that the native title to customary land "cannot be asserted or enforced 
against the Crown by any form of legal proceeding." As against the Crown "it is not a legal 
title at all, but a mere moral claim under the Treaty of Waitangi to obtain a Crown grant" (at 
xi). See also s 84 (customary title not to avail against the Crown). 
47 This Part of the Act was also passed to stifle pending claims to the Rotorua lakes and Ahuriri 
Lagoon (Napier): R Boast in Peter Spiller, Jeremy Finn and Richard Boast (eds) A New Zealand 
Legal History (Brookers, Wellington, 1995) 160; A Frame Salmond: Southern Jurist (VUW Press, 
Wellington, 1995) 112-119. 
48 See comments of Attorney-General Sir J Findlay stating that in rendering the customary title 
unenforceable against the Crown, the Act's provisions were designed to clarify things once 
and for all: (1909) 148 NZPD, 1273. Also Frame, above n 47, 113. 
49  Nireaha Tamaki v Baker (1900-01); [1840-1932] NZPCC 371. 
50  Wallis v Solicitor-General [1903] AC 173. 
51  Refer comments of James Carroll, Native Minister, explaining the Bill in Committee stage, 
(1902) NZPD 120, 375. 
52 Frame, above n 47, 114 notes Salmond considered it possible - and sufficient - that Maori could 
still obtain a declaratory judgment recognising their subsisting customary title or make an 
application to the Native Land Court. 
53 Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington (1877) 3 NZ Jur (OS) 72. DV Williams warns against 
(whiggishly) demonizing Prendergast CJ saying that he was no more than applying the 
accepted position of his time: "Te Tiriti o Waitangi - Unique Relationship Between the Crown 
and Tangata Whenua?" in IH Kawharu (ed) Waitangi: Maori and Pakeha Perspectives (Oxford 
University Press, Auckland, 1990) 64. 
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also endorsed54 - as did most of his legal brethren within the country.55 There was a broad 
legal and political consensus that relations with Maori were encompassed within that non-
justiciable area of the constitution comprising legal sovereignty. In this particular area, law 
and practice showed there was not what Salmond elsewhere called a "definite scheme of 
organised structure and operation",56 except for that expressly laid down by the relevant 
statutes. Maori thus lacked any constitutional status or legal rights arising from their 
aboriginality - those dealings fell under the non-justiciable royal prerogative - except to the 
extent rights had been conferred by statute. 
This part of our legal history has been looked at with increasing detail by scholars and 
Tribunal and I do not want to treat it other than in terms of the themes of this paper. But it 
can be observed that this phase was consistent with the constitutional climate and the 
prevalent notions of justiciability - with the dominance of a sovereign-centred 
constitutionalism in which the singular constitutional will of the Crown-as-Leviathan 
prevailed, or to put it another way the constitution seen essentially as a monologue. 
Relations with Maori were subsumed into the prerogative of the Crown which like all the 
powers of the legal sovereign remained beyond judicial reach. Maori were only accorded 
those rights expressly arising from the sovereign's will; that is, by statute. Maori's 
experience was that of the country at large, except they were crushed rather than cradled 
by Leviathan's gaze. There was no room or place for their voice in the historical and 
ongoing narrative of the New Zealand constitution. 
III LIVING IN CLAIMS-TIME 
I have depicted this Age of Leviathan as emerging at the end of the nineteenth century 
from an incipient nationalism as well as an emergent cultural liberalism which stressed a 
humane and rational social order. With their linked themes of national destiny, 
egalitarianism, individualism and universalism, this nationalism and liberalism fed the 
more specific constitutional narrative. By the early 1960s the unified tradition was at its 
peak - as Sir John Salmond would have it, constitutional law and practice had tended 
towards one another. Maori had been substantially marginalised as a political force. This 
weakness left them more exposed to the ruthless logic of Leviathan, a vulnerability also 
experienced at this time by the aboriginal peoples of Canada and Australia. In all 
jurisdictions the detail differed but the core intention was the same: the Government 
  
54 Frame, above n 47, 115 discussing Salmond's resistance to "judicialisation" of Maori claims 
which he contrasts with the "modern fashion" under the New Zealand Court of Appeal in the 
state enterprises cases and Waitangi Tribunal. 
55 See the Protest of Bench and Bar (1902) [1840-1932] NZPCC App 730. Salmond had returned to 
New Zealand from Adelaide in 1906, four years after this Protest. 
56  Salmond, above n 44, 636. 
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regarded the retention by aboriginal peoples of special legal rights and status as 
discriminatory and proposed the removal of those rights. Faced with the loss of their 
remaining legal protection and status, aboriginal peoples were forced to assert their 
identity and sought legal elevation rather than elimination of their legal status. It was from 
Leviathan's final squeeze that what are often called "the years of anger" began. 
During the 1970s, the claims of Maori began to take a new profile in political life - the 
great Land March, Bastion Point and the Raglan Golf Course are all episodes many of us 
will recall from this period in national life. The new Labour Government elected in 1972 
reformed Maori affairs in numerous ways, of which in hindsight the most notable proved 
to be the establishment of the Waitangi Tribunal, although its jurisdiction did not then 
extend to historic claims.  
Self-determination was the major overarching theme of these renewed claims: the right 
of native peoples to retain their cultural integrity whilst also enjoying full participation in 
the economic life of the nation-state. Rehabilitation of their land rights, with all the 
associated protective and restitutive elements, was invariably seen by native peoples 
themselves as part of this claim. However, in this new claims environment the Crown (in 
Canada most especially) insisted upon distinguishing issues of self-government (imperium) 
from land and related historical claims (dominium). In overall terms the axis of these 
claims, that of sovereignty or imperium and appropriation or dominium, was one 
thoroughly familiar to the history of western political discourse.57 Formulated in these 
terms aboriginal claims had accessibility, being articulated in the lingua parlata of the 
system from which they sought redress. However, the state's tactic was to separate 
sovereignty (imperium) from appropriation (dominium). That was a strategy mostly resisted 
by aboriginal people themselves as well as their radical supporters who bore an anti-state 
agenda of their own. 
So it is that in these "years of anger" - the politics of claims-time - we have Maori claims 
pitched at two levels: imperium and dominium. It is hardly surprising that the Crown would 
try to confine those claims to the more specific level of dominium. In part this was because 
the issue of sovereignty was then, as now, inherently elusive and unresolvable. But also 
Maori, like the Canadian First Nations, were claiming that which Leviathan could not 
countenance: the existence within the state of alternative and untouchable sites of political 
authority. At this level the discourse of sovereignty involved the counterposition of an 
alternative sovereignty to that of the Crown. Essentially this was the politics of competing 
sovereignties, the politics not only of imitation but disputation and separation. This was 
nonetheless rhetorically attractive and politically flamboyant politics, attention-grabbing 
  
57 "Law, Sovereignty and History" above n 6. 
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language and postures which required some response from the political system. The 
establishment of mechanisms to resolve Maori claims was part of that response. 
So whilst Maori claims were being protested at this grand theatrical level of imperium, 
they were also being pursued by more moderate and practical Maori politicians at the 
more specific level of dominium, land claims. At this level Leviathan was not being 
challenged so much as petitioned, for the claims process was one of reaffirming the subject 
status of Maori, unlike the sovereignty claim. The mere making of the claim against the 
Crown supposed the capacity of the Crown to resolve it. In supposing the Crown's 
restorative powers, the claims process invested it with redemptive agency. This involved a 
subtle compromise of the sovereignty claim, one invisibly impairing aboriginal agency. 
The aboriginal peoples became supplicants before a Crown which was given the blame 
entirely for the colonialised condition of aboriginal peoples. Leviathan's authority over 
native people was thus confirmed rather than contested. 
The dominium claims process also has other features which made it appealing to an 
awakened Leviathan: it fed specific claims into the political system with an implied 
expectation of eventual closure and exit. That is, it supposed that the difficulties that 
existed arose from the claim itself rather than the wider relationship between Crown and 
tribe. Once the claim became resolved it was - and still is - assumed that the relationship 
will no longer be problematic and that Maori will merge back into the population.58 
Indeed this use of the claim as the fulcrum of the tribe's relationship with the Crown has 
become so compelling that tribes with whom a so-called full and final settlement has 
ostensibly been reached insist it is no more than a settlement for this generation. Maori are 
deeply suspicious of the "f" words, "full", "final" and "fixed", as they feel that resolution of 
the claim will be seen as severing the Treaty relationship.59 Maori politics thrives on this 
concept of the take (cause of action), but it frustrates Pakeha with their own cultural and 
political assumptions of closure and exit from the claim. Maori, of course, are seeing the 
claim as the lever for their management of their Treaty relationship with the Crown. This 
they know is an ongoing one. But that is not how most Pakeha see - or have been sold - the 
claims process. Their politicians have been giving them scant sense of the need to establish 
mechanisms for the ongoing relationship between Crown (the state) and Maori beyond the 
  
58 More fully PG McHugh "Aboriginal Identity and Relations in North America and Australasia" 
in K Coates & P G McHugh (eds) Kokiri Ngatahi - Living Relationships: The Treaty of Waitangi in 
the New Millenium (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 1998) 107, especially 114-116; A 
Fleras and R Maaka "Rethinking Claims-making as Maori Affairs Policy" 3 He Pukenga Korero 
(A Journal of Maori Studies) 43. 
59  N Harris "Full and Final Settlement of Treaty Grievances: The Crown's Constitutional Agenda" 
(1996) 8 Auck U LR 205; P Shand "Fixing Settlement: An Analysis of Government Policy for 
Settling Tiriti Grievances" (1998) 8 Auck U LR 739, especially 756-765. 
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claims process. In that regard the Maori position seems by far the less naive. Nonetheless, 
the implicit promise of closure and exit has been fundamental to the dominium claims 
process and whilst it may emphasise a result rather than a relationship, those results 
themselves (now they are beginning to happen in New Zealand and Canada) are altering 
significantly the landscape of aboriginal relations. 
The sovereignty or imperium level of Maori claims was one where Leviathan's courts 
could hardly venture and where common law jurists tiptoed defensively.60 Whenever 
aboriginal sovereignty has been raised in the courts the judicial response has been sharp 
and immediately dismissive.61 In the non-legal sphere, however, imperium was, as I have 
mentioned, open to discussion. Whilst Maori and their radical supporters could posit an 
alternative subsisting sovereignty as absolute as that claimed by the Crown,62 others 
looked more closely instead at Leviathan's exercise of its own. Historians - Claudia Orange 
most famously - and the Waitangi Tribunal (the latter consciously removing any strict 
legal cap) led here. These sources produced critical accounts of Leviathan's treatment of 
Maori which nourished and gave political momentum to the dominium process. These were 
essentially historical reports; state-centred histories about Leviathan's exercise of imperium 
rather than the location of alternative sovereignties elsewhere in the islands. These 
histories were extremely present-minded descriptions of the past with guilt and Crown 
  
60  Notably Professor FM Brookfield "Maori Rights and Two Radical Writers: Review and 
Response" [1990] NZLJ 406; Professor FM Brookfield "Kelsen, The Constitution and the Treaty" 
(1992) 15 NZULR 163; Professor FM Brookfield "The Treaty, the 1840 Revolution and 
Responsible Government" (1992) 5 Canterbury L Rev 59; Professor FM Brookfield "Parliament, 
the Treaty, and Freedom - Millennial Hopes and Speculations" in Essays on the Constitution 
above n 36, 41-60. See also the analysis in RA Sharp Justice and the Maori: Maori Claims in New 
Zealand Political Argument in the 1980s (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1990) 266-281. 
Suggestions that Parliamentary sovereignty may not be so absolute in Treaty matters have 
been made by current members of the New Zealand bench (before appointment): S Elias (now 
Chief Justice) "The Treaty of Waitangi and the Separation of Powers in New Zealand" in BD 
Gray and RB McClintock (eds) Courts Policy: Checking the Balance (Brookers, Wellington, 1995) 
206; Sir K Keith "The Roles of the Tribunal, the Courts and the Legislature" (1995) 25 VUWLR 
129, 139 calling it "a possible argument." 
61 Berkett v Tauranga District Court [1992] 3 NZLR 206, 207-208 (HC) per Fisher J; Harawira v R (5 
October 1990) unreported, High Court, Whangarei Registry, AP 38/90 per Chilwell J noted in 
[1991] NZ Recent LR 149, 156. Walker v New South Wales (1994) 182 CLR 45, 48-49 per Mason CJ 
(citing Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1; Coe v Commonwealth (1993) 118 ALR 193, 
200); Coe v Commonwealth (1978) 18 ALR 592; Coe v Commonwealth (1979) 24 ALR 118. Also C 
Bell and M Asch "Challenging Assumptions: The Impact of Precedent in Aboriginal Rights 
Litigation" in M Asch (ed) Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in Canada Essays on Law, Equality and 
Respect for Difference (UBC Press, Vancouver, 1997) 39, 45. 
62 See Sharp, above n 60, 256-265. Also Ranganui Walker "Maori Sovereignty, Colonial and 
Postcolonial Discourses" in Havemann (ed), above n 8, 108. 
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response as their goal. In these "histories" the Treaty of Waitangi became a Lockean 
contract, the measure of legitimacy of Crown behaviour towards Maori: histories not of 
alternative sovereignties but the legitimacy in the exercise of the one - that held by the 
Crown.63 
It was the courts, however, which played the pivotal role in taking things into the third 
phase, the politics of settlement. This was achieved through the two classic doctrinal pre-
occupations of the common law: the recognition of subsisting property rights and 
insistence upon procedural regularity. 
First, courts in Australasia64 and Canada65 developed doctrine inconceivable a century 
before when aboriginal relations were regarded as part of the royal prerogative. The 
common law doctrine of aboriginal title became recognised judicially as a means of 
protecting extant aboriginal property rights. The doctrine was not, nor should it now be, 
seen as a literal reconstruction of the past.66 It is a common law depiction - the giving of 
contemporary legal consequence to certain facts of the past. It is today's legal, not 
yesterday's historical, truth. In Canada and Australia the doctrine has held enormous 
implications for the vast interior landmasses with their mineral riches. In Canada it has led 
to important land claims settlements in the north, although in Australia, Leviathan's 
response to its courts' recognition of the property rights of Aboriginal people has been 
vastly less respectful. New Zealand courts have also recognised the doctrine, although its 
scope remains uncertain. Aboriginal property rights are no longer a non-justiciable aspect 
of the Crown's prerogative - an incident of its unreviewable imperium as they were in the 
Age of Leviathan. They have become a question of dominium recognised and protected by 
the rule of law. This is a major change in judicial attitude, as some courts have noted, 
however much of the doctrine is dressed falsely as some historical truth.  
Related to the recognition of aboriginal title has been the court's willingness to look at 
the relationship between aboriginal peoples and the Crown. This has been done by the 
  
63 More fully PG McHugh "Law, History and the Treaty of Waitangi" (1997) 31 New Zealand 
Journal of History 117. 
64  Mabo v State of Queensland (1992) 175 CLR 1; Wik Peoples v State of Queensland (1996) 187 CLR 1; 
Te Weehi v Regional Fisheries Officer [1986] 1 NZLR 680 (CA); Te Runanga o Muriwhenua Inc v 
Attorney-General [1990] 2 NZLR 641 (CA); Te Runanganui o Te Ika Whenua Inc v Attorney-General 
[1994] 2 NZLR 20 (CA); Faulkner v Tauranga District Council [1996] 1 NZLR 357 (CA). 
65 Calder v Attorney-General for British Columbia (1973) 34 DLR (3d) 145 (SCC); Guerin v The Queen 
[1984] 2 SCR 335. 
66 This has become the trend in Canada where claims are being brought for the invalidation of 
land titles on the basis of an historic infraction of the doctrine: Chippewas of Sarnia Band v 
Attorney-General of Canada (30 April 1999) Ontario Superior Court, per Archie Campbell J. 
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careful placing of the traditional sovereignty paradigm to one side as that is, of course, 
territory into which the courts will not venture. But despite this care there is nonetheless 
an aboriginal dimension permeating through the complex systems of public decision-
making and administration. The Crown's relations with aboriginal peoples have been 
reconstructed by the common law through the transplantation of private law concepts into 
the public realm, and a growing insistence upon aboriginal participation and presence in 
public decision-making. The exercise of public power, notably a discretion arising from 
statute or prerogative, is now construed in terms of the Crown's fiduciary duties, 
obligations of good faith and partnership. The relationship that this produces is not 
necessarily one where there are any substantial limitations upon the power of Leviathan 
(except in Canada as a result of section 35 of the Charter). Rather this fiduciary 
relationship affects the manner in which Leviathan's officials exercise their constitutionally 
held discretionary power. 
The emergence of a new judicial attitude towards the justiciability of aboriginal claims 
and their relations with the Crown can be seen as part of a broader trend in public law 
during the 1970s and 1980s. It is commonplace to see the recent history of public law in 
terms of the courts reasserting the equipoise of Dicey's two pillars of the common law 
constitution; the supremacy of Parliament and the rule of law. The rapid development of 
the common law of aboriginal rights should be seen as part of that trend in public law 
towards a greater willingness to render official conduct justiciable. No longer were the 
Crown's relations with Maori regarded as part of a special non-justiciable prerogative. In 
Treaty and matters of aboriginal rights the Court signalled that the Crown did not hold an 
open-ended discretion. 
Therefore, the judgments of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in the Maori Council 
cases have been an important landmark in our national jurisprudence, a step in which the 
great contribution of Sir Robin Cooke (as he then was) should not go unnoticed.67 These 
cases have been fine examples of the modern common law working in the public sphere. 
The judgments did not confer substantive rights on Maori but required the Crown to enter 
into dialogue with Maori to agree on an outcome suitable to both. The judgments were 
concerned with voice and procedure, with legal principle guiding but not dictating the 
relationship and the accommodations to be reached.  
The importance of these cases lay also in the way in which they have subtly defused 
the imperium debate. The Court spoke of tino rangatiratanga not in terms of the old 
  
67 The cases are New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [1987] 1 NZLR 641 (CA); Tainui 
Maori Trust Board v Attorney-General [1989] 2 NZLR 513 (CA); New Zealand Maori Council v 
Attorney-General [1989] 2 NZLR 142 (CA); Attorney-General v New Zealand Maori Council [1991] 
2 NZLR 129 (CA). 
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Hobbesian paradigm, although it did note the rule of Parliamentary supremacy.68 Instead, 
relations with Maori were taken out of that vertical relation and put into a more horizontal 
zone. Necessarily that was a somewhat uneven or assymetrical one, but the Court 
conceived of Maori relations with the Crown in the language of personal relations: 
partnership, obligations of good faith, fiduciary-like duties. In other words, Crown - Maori 
relations were now seen as on-going and based on dialogue rather than the singularity of 
the Crown's one constitutional will. One commentator has described this judicial 
reconstruction of the relationship between Crown and Maori as establishing a common 
law ground of "constitutional" (as opposed to ordinary judicial) review.69 
One finds a similar position in Canada where the federal government has recognised, 
since 1995, the inherent right to self-government as an aboriginal right under section 35 of 
the Charter.70 The inherent right is not packaged in the language of imperium, which itself 
is problematic in Canada with Quebec separatism. Instead self-government has been 
presented less combustibly as essentially a co-operative process to be played out in 
particular agreements with the various native groups. There is the public form of 
government in Nunavut,71 whilst other First Nations and bands have tended towards a 
municipal form.72 
In New Zealand and Canada this rhetoric of new - or rather renewed - relations has 
been made effective by the conclusion of major claims settlements. However this is also 
generating a new climate - the politics of settlement - at which we will look now in terms 
of the two themes of constitutional and historiographical practice. 
IV SETTLEMENT-TIME 
Relations between Crown and Maori have entered, or rather are entering, a new phase 
which I have been calling "settlement-time". This is a new, more complex phase which is 
still very much at a formative stage of jurisprudential development, but which will grow 
  
68  New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [1987] 1 NZLR 641, 668 (CA). 
69  P A Joseph "Constitutional Review Now" [1998] NZ Law Rev 85. 
70  See PG McHugh "Aboriginal Identity and Relations in North America and Australasia" in K 
Coates & P G McHugh (eds) Kokiri Ngatahi: Living Relationships (Victoria University Press, 
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71  Nunavut Act (Can), 40-41-42 Eliz II (1993), cap 28. See also D Purich The Inuit and Their Land: 
The Story of Nunavut (James Porimer and Co, Toronto, 1992). 
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in sophistication and complexity in the future. However, it is possible to identify, albeit in 
a very general and still rather nonspecific way, several emergent features of this new 
landscape. 
In the politics of settlement one finds less recourse to the old sovereign relation. The 
reality may be that Parliament can legislate as it pleases and the practice of not legislating 
without Maori consent may be described in Diceyan terms as a constitutional convention. 
However, the political reality is that this convention has become formalised beyond the 
unwritten gentlemen's understanding of Dicey's description. The Maori voice is now more 
fully and formally incorporated into the legislative process. That trend in itself is part of 
the broader feature of the politics of settlement - a much greater awareness and 
meticulousness within government about procedure and ensuring the aboriginal voice. 
The political system - including its legal sphere - acknowledges now what previously it 
sought to suppress, namely the presence of dispersed sites of political authority within the 
existing constitutional framework.73 The concern of public law - not least in the field of 
aboriginal-Crown relations - is with the recognition and management of difference. Two 
years ago the federal government of Canada distributed a booklet to its departments 
setting out how to incorporate the Crown's fiduciary duties into governmental procedure. 
The federal government noted the lack of clarity surrounding this fiduciary duty but saw it 
mainly (and I think rightly) in procedural terms. Today, Government officials overlook or 
dismiss the aboriginal element at their peril. 
The politics of settlement have also produced a more complex, diverse theatre. No 
longer is there the simple bipartite claims-based relation of Crown and Maori. In 
settlement-time national politics begins to experience the vitality and diversity of 
aboriginal politics. One notable expression of that has been native groups bringing their 
internal disputes and political wrangling before the courts. These cases often concern 
leadership and decision-making within the First Nation, tribe or band. The other type of 
case, yet really to emerge in New Zealand, concerns the rights and (more usually) liability 
of the aboriginal group to third parties in contract and tort. As they manage their growing 
asset-base and enter into relations with third parties, disputatiousness is only to be 
expected. It is a natural enough feature of politics everywhere. As the profile of such 
litigation grows - as inevitably it will - we may expect to see an emergent indigenisation of 
the common law as it responds to and absorbs elements of native custom in particular 
areas such as the law of obligations. 
There is an issue here about the extent to which the courts should be drawn into 
matters of internal aboriginal politics. Necessarily they will have to adjudicate where third 
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party interests are involved - contracts of employment are an example in the Canadian 
caselaw.74 However, should the courts resolve issues of disputed leadership or decision-
making processes arising entirely within aboriginal society? In the United States the 
doctrine of residual tribal sovereignty has enabled courts largely to avoid issues of 
leadership selection, mandate and, to some extent, of status.75 But we know that no such 
doctrine applies in the common law jurisdictions of Australasia and Canada. There has 
been, for example, an enormous growth in litigation in Canada over band council 
elections. The Canadian courts76 have been using principles of administrative law in these 
and other matters of internal aboriginal processes. However, there is an artificiality about 
this which, although it may lead to workable results, is not especially satisfying in 
principle. In New Zealand how does the potential for such judicial intervention square 
with tino rangatiratanga? Maori have long been used to the Maori Land Court having 
something of a role in their internal politics and deliberations but that has mainly related 
to the administration of a specific and rather depleted asset, Maori freehold land. Such 
settlements as those affecting Tainui, Ngai Tahu and Whakaue put such issues in an 
entirely different ball park. 
In settlement-time, other players like large national and transnational corporations 
have also entered the field. These too have begun making deals with native peoples. Many 
of these companies are adopting specific policies and cultivating their relations with 
aboriginal peoples through instruments such as joint ventures, employment policies and 
revenue-sharing agreements: a scenario unthinkable a generation ago. And apparently 
new players - new native groups claiming ethnic identity - also enter the picture. Existing 
aboriginal polities (tribe, sub-tribe or band) sometimes divide to produce new tribes, sub-
tribes or bands. This in turn raises issues about the nature of political change and re-
organisation within aboriginal culture and national politics at large: for instance, urban 
aboriginals have been identifying themselves ethnically through their patterns of residence 
and association rather than tribal affiliation or other historically established forms of 
status.77 The status of these people within aboriginal politics is unclear and controversial. 
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As the dispute in the courts about the allocation of the Maori fisheries income has been 
demonstrating, the mechanisms of the national political system will be co-opted in such 
situations. If in claims-time it was possible to speak simplistically and singularly of an 
"aboriginal voice", in settlement-time there is a dynamic plurality not always singing from 
the same hymn sheet. 
As aboriginal litigation continues one begins to note a curious trend at least in 
litigation against the Crown. For the most part there is a distinct sense today that the 
landmark judgments on aboriginal rights have been given and that most judicial activity is 
regarded as filling in the detail. That detail is not as responsive to aboriginal peoples as 
might have been hoped, indeed it is showing a marked unresponsiveness. The judgments 
of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Van der Peet78 and Delgamuukw79 cases highlight 
this emergent judicial reluctance to extend common law aboriginal title rights and to keep 
those as "way of life" rights, as a circumscribed dominium kept well away from the 
imperium zone.80 These cases have limited the aboriginal title to its traditional elements, 
particularly aboriginal servitudes and have not included self-determination within the 
scope of section 35 of the Charter. The property right is preserved but denied a dynamic 
element.81 The judgment of the majority of the Court of Appeal in McRitchie82 (the trout 
fishing case) is fully consistent with that trend,83 however much we heed the majority's 
protestation that the judgment is limited to the particular facts. 
Alongside the increasing conservatism in caselaw doctrine is a growing judicial 
undercurrent that the questions coming before the courts arising from the Crown's new 
forms of agreement with aboriginal peoples are less amenable to judicial resolution. In 
New Zealand this is justified through the rhetoric of "partnership" with its underlying 
contractualist approach, seeing the area of relations encompassed by (potential) 
negotiation as a "political zone" best left to the parties for dialogue and agreement amongst 
themselves. This is a position with which many Maori concur.84 So we reach the paradox 
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where these relations between Crown and Maori seem to be re-acquiring a measure of 
non-justiciability.  
This process - the jurisprudence of settlement - has been called the "commodification" 
of Maori claims.85 Certainly some such outcome was inevitable if the negotiation required 
by the courts was to be conducted in good faith and sincerity (as undoubtedly appears to 
be the case). Crown and Maori would have to agree to something and that must result in 
the quantification of the Treaty rights alleged to have been violated. The growing 
sophistication and complexity of this jurisprudence signals also that the compass of the 
rule of law is being redrawn so as to include Maori relations with the Crown and amongst 
themselves. This has been accomplished by the discarding of the old Diceyan fixation with 
the "who" question concerning the location of paramount imperium. Instead the courts have 
become more concerned - as they have in other spheres of public life - with the manner of 
exercise of public power as it reaches into Maori life. The boundaries of the rule of law 
have been redrawn and the sovereignty of the state reasserted, sovereignty in the sense of 
the integrity of a system governed by law. Beneath this is the realisation that public 
authority is exercised within a set of political relationships reached by law. This spreading 
notion of justiciability, however unresolved and indeterminate its reach may at present be, 
has not been confined to Maori issues, and highlights this returning re-equilibrium in 
public law between Dicey's two pillars of the constitution. This is the equipoise lost during 
Leviathan's century. 
And how do we view the past of our constitution in the new landscape of settlement-
time? Well the certainties and the comforts (for those who could take them) of the Age of 
Leviathan are truly gone. If claims-time made us review the Crown's exercise of its 
imperium over aboriginal peoples, the theme of settlement-time seems to be the rediscovery 
of dispersed political authority. The fiction fostered by the nationalism, liberalism and 
protectionism of the Age of Leviathan has dissolved and constitutional practice has 
become more concerned with the management rather than supression of difference. The 
reform of the New Zealand electoral system into Mixed Member Proportional 
Representation (MMP) is a dramatic expression of some such realisation and constitutional 
provision for multiple voices within the political system. MMP can be seen as an attempt, 
although perhaps no more than a partial one, to rehabilitate the representative principle as 
the mechanism for constitutional containment. 
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And how does this diverse polity with its "strange multiplicity" see itself historically? 
New Zealand historians like Jamie Belich86, Judith Binney87 and Angela Ballara88 are 
telling us of a past in which there were alternative mutually-acknowledging and dynamic 
sites of political authority. New Zealand constitutional historians - that rare breed - will, I 
expect, rediscover our political history before the Age of Leviathan. This was a period of 
30 to 40 years, a good generation or so of constitutional experience, when governance 
within New Zealand was seen more in federative terms89 than the metropolitan 
absolutism of the Colonial Office. In the first half-century after British sovereignty, New 
Zealand experienced not only the quasi-diplomatic highly dynamic politics of tribalism, 
but also provincialism90 and the country also debated imperial federation.91 Those 
histories of dispersed and not necessarily antagonistic sovereignties may have been 
disjointed and momentary but they were not false starts in the inevitable progress towards 
the centralising Age of Leviathan. At the time they were major issues in political life and 
those who participated themselves felt no sense of historical inevitability any less or more 
than that which we feel today. If today we lack a sense of the place such matters held on 
our ancestors' political agenda it is only because we have since been swamped by the 
history of Leviathan. But at least we are losing that awe for the majesty of Leviathan that 
was transmitted to this "Better Britain" in the South Seas and which gripped the 
constitutional imagination of earlier generations.  
V CONCLUSION 
So as New Zealand encounters the politics of settlement there are new demands upon 
its public law and the sense we have of our constitutional past. We know today that the 
constitution is not the place of tranquility and harmony we might once have been led to 
believe yet, like the Argonauts' ship, it is still the same constitution. Today a constitution is 
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about the navigation of difference and that also is becoming the means by which we 
understand it historically. The rule of Parliamentary supremacy remains, but it does not 
wrap us in a warm cosy blanket of reassurance. It simply tells us where the ultimate law-
making authority in our constitutional system is located. Our political culture has realised 
that national pluralism cannot be accommodated wholly through the representative 
principle and that, perhaps, is the single most important change in our constitutional 
consciousness this century. That consciousness has moved from a denial of diversity 
through realisation to living with it. And if that means our constitutional culture seems 
more turbulent then that is more likely a sign of constitutional maturity than a nostalgic 
hearkening back to the complacent fictions of an harmonious and homogenous polity. 
Those fed the constitutional requirements of another time and only a segment of the 
nation.  
It is clear that the position of the aboriginal peoples of New Zealand in the common 
law constitution is plainly not the same as a century ago. Yet, to recall the Argonauts' 
metaphor, it is still demonstrably the same common law; the common law then as now 
caught up in its turbulent present, improvising with doctrine and navigating through its 
past by the needs of the present. Imperfect perhaps and its work always unfinished, but a 
sincere, hardworking and vital tradition which we celebrate in this centenary of the law 
teaching in Wellington, New Zealand's capital city. 
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